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iiiI. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
It is  the sense of Congress  that - (1) the European Community's
proposed rebalancing of import protections  is  fundamentally at
odds with the  important goals of liberalizing world agricultural
trade and eliminating trade-distorting policies;  (2) such
rebalancing could have a particularly severe  impact on United
States exports of corn gluten feed and oilseeds to  the European
Community, leaving them vulnerable to unfair treatment and
increased trade barriers;  and (3) the United States,  throughout
the remainder of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations on
agriculture, should forcefully reject the European Community's
proposal to rebalance import protections.
Excerpt  from Sec.  1559 Food, Agriculture, Conservation and
Trade Act of 1990.
Status quo. Latin for the mess were in.
Jeve Moorman
The first quote  illustrates  the vehement opposition of the U.S.
Congress  to the proposed European Community (EC) policy to  "rebalance" the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  Rebalancing would result in the
restriction of trade in corn gluten feed, soybeans, soybean meal and oil
and the lowering of overall commodity support.  The  latter quote expresses
the EC's frustration with the current policy of a zero binding duty on corn
gluten feed, soybeans and soybean meal.  This paper will examine the
impacts of the various proposals the EC would like to implement under
"rebalancing" and that the United States  is  so opposed.
THE NEED TO REBALANCE
In the early 1960's,  during the Dillon Round of GATT negotiations,  the
EC negotiated zero binding duties on soybeans,  linseed,  flaxseed, oilcakes,
and cotton.  The  EC was thus restricted from imposing import duties on
these products without directly violating  the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade  (GATT).  At the time, soybeans were of little importance  in
international trade, with only 4,090,000 tons being traded in 1961  (Oil
1World).  Furthermore, there were no varieties of soybeans available that
could be grown in the EC.  Thus,  the Community had no producers  to protect
and found it in their best  interest to keep their borders open to soybeans
and their products.
With feed grains, however, the  EC was using the very effective
variable  import levy  (VIL).  The VIL establishes  a domestic support price
above the world price and charges a import levy equal  to  the  difference.
Consumers and livestock producers then pay higher prices that are created
by the VIL.  This system was practical until  the early to mid 1970's when
the high internal prices encouraged surplus production that had to be
exported.
To maintain the high domestic support price, the EC created a variable
export subsidy  (VES) to render EC grains  competitive on the world market
without driving down the internal price.  The VES  is essentially a
restitution payment for the difference between the internal price and the
lower world price.  The production of surplus crops and subsidization of
exports continued throughout the seventies and eighties.  As exports
increased so did budgetary outlays.  The costs became critical in the
eighties when the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) budget became  tougher to
balance as VIL revenues were replaced with VES outlays.  The budget began
to be financed primarily through the value added tax (VAT) collected from
the member countries.  In 1985,  the VAT accounted for  58.3 percent of EC
revenues  (von  Witzke and Houck, 1987).  Yet as the VAT increased to finance
the CAP, some countries found they were paying to  support farmers  in other
countries more than their own producers.  The rising costs and unequitable
distribution of funds has served as an impetus to CAP reform.
2Meanwhile,  the high internal costs of feed grains, forced livestock
producers  to substitute to  the relatively cheaper soybean meal being
imported under zero duty binding. Soybeans, also being  imported duty free,
were being crushed in the EC which led to  the development of  a large EC
crushing industry.  The crushing industry also grew due to heavy
subsidization.  See section 3.  The  competition between the grains  and
soybean meal thus aggravated the rising cost of cereal grain protection.
In addition to the competition between feed grains  and soybean meal,
soybean oil competes with vegetable oils and when used in margarine,
contends with butter.  Protected vegetable oils in the EC are sunflower
oil, olive oil and rapeseed oil.  Olive oil has become a primary concern as
the accession of Spain and Portugal  into the EC is  expected to double EC
expenditures on its olive oil regime  (Davis, et. al.,  1986).  Furthermore,
soybean oil  is  the main factor in the production of margarine which also
competes with butter.  These vegetable oils and butter are protected under
the CAP and because soybean oil decreases their consumption, serves to
further  irritate CAP budgetary problems.
This subsidization of oilseeds has  come under attack by the American
Soybean Association  (ASA).  In December 1987,  the ASA filed a section 301
unfair trade petition with the U.S. Trade Representative, claiming the EC
oilseed subsidy was a "thinly disguised import barrier"  (Gleckler and
Tweeten, 1990b).  In response, the GATT dispute settlement panel ruled that
the oilseed subsidies violated GATT trading rules.  The EC has agreed to
eliminate the subsidy unless an accord can be reached in the Uruguay Round.
The GATT ruling coupled with CAP budget problems has led to the
"rebalancing" proposals.  It is believed by EC policy makers that a
3restriction on soybean and meal imports would solve the problems described
above by raising revenues and reducing the need for large oilseed
subsidies.  Restricting soybean and meal imports would complete the CAP by
solving the contradiction created by the zero binding duty on oilseed and
product imports  (Haniotis & Ames,  1988).
THE PROPOSALS
Consequently, there have been many suggested policy solutions.  Those
to be examined here are as  follows:
1. a 75  ECU/mt consumption tax on EEC vegetable oils;
2. a 20%  import tariff on soybean meal and an equivalent tariff
on soybeans;
3. a 30%  decrease in the support price of corn and other feed
grains;  and
4. a 10%  tariff on soybean meal  (equivalent bean tariff) and a
15%  decrease in the support price of corn and other feed
grains.
In 1987,  the  EC Commission proposed a consumption tax on marine and
vegetable oils as a part of its agricultural price package  (Haniotis &
Ames,  1988).  This proposal was met with opposition by the United States,
for a tax was viewed as a direct violation of the zero duty binding
agreement.  The U.S. threatened the  EC with an escalation of U.S.-EC
agricultural trade disputes if the  tax were imposed.  This  increase in
trade tensions would make both countries worse off, through decreased
trade, worker displacement and lost productivity (Houck, 1987).  However,
the EC Commission sees  the imposition of a tax as an effective way to
decrease  the production of soybean oil,  and soybean  imports,  as well as
4generating new revenues  (Haniotis & Ames,  1988).
The second policy alternative the  EC has considered is a tariff on
soybean meal and an effective  tariff on soybeans.  This policy has recently
been proposed, but as with the consumption tax has been rejected by the
United States.  More blatant than a tax, the tariff violates GATT articles
and the Dillon Round compromise.
The third option which derives appeal from decreasing subsidy outlays
and liberalizing trade ixa decrease in the support price of feed grains.
Since  soybean meal and feed grains are substitutes, decreasing the EC feed
grain support price would make feed grains relatively cheaper to livestock
producers.  Producers would then substitute back to  feed grains  from
soybean meal, decreasing the demand for soybean meal and its  importation.
A  lower support price would also decrease budget expenditures  on feed grain
variable export subsidies and alleviate competition between soybean oil,
butter and other vegetable oils.
It  is  likely that the resulting change  in soybean and product policy
will be negotiated in the Uruguay Round of trade talks.  Even if the  talks
fail, the EC could move unilaterally to rebalance  the CAP due  to rising
internal pressures and costs.  The full rebalancing proposal on the table
in Geneva has been to restrict  imports of soybeans, soybean meal and corn
gluten feed in exchange for lowering the overall  level of EC commodity
support.  Support expenditures would be decreased and revenue increased
from tariffs or other border measures.
The purpose of this paper is  to examine these policy alternatives and
determine the best alternative for the  EC.  The effects  of these policies
on the United States will also be reviewed since the EC  imports over one-
5third of U.S. soybean and soybean meal production  (Tutwiler & Rossmiller,
1987).  Each policy will first be viewed from a partial equilibrium
standpoint to determine the price and quantity effects on the EC and U.S.
markets.  Next, basic welfare analysis of consumer, producer and government
surplus will be applied to each policy to ascertain the best alternative
from a social welfare perspective.
II.  BRIEF LITERATURE SURVEY
Several studies have estimated the effects of "rebalancing."  Huyser
and Meyers  (1985) evaluated the  impacts  of a 20%  reduction of the  EC corn
threshold price and a 20%  import tariff on both soybeans and soybean meal.
The analysis was based on a non-linear regional trade model containing ten
countries, seven of which were endogenous,  including the EC.  However, the
EC oil market was not treated endogenously.  Furthermore, soybean and meal
demand in the  EC was not related to animal production, a key component in
soybean meal demand and thus  soybean demand.
In both scenarios, the effect on U.S. soybean export value was
approximately a 30%  reduction.  However, the application of the tariff rate
creates a problem.  The  ad valorem rate is  20%  for both beans and meal.  By
using the same rate and not an effective rate for soybeans,  the authors  are
simulating a scenario  in which the soybean price would increase by a
relatively larger amount than that of meal.  This would encourage EC
importers to purchase meal instead of beans, thus undermining the EC's
crushing industry.  The importance of the EC crushing sector is
demonstrated by its high level of subsidization,  (see section 3) making it
politically unlikely that the EC would impose an equal tariff versus an
effective tariff.
6Peterson and Auerbach (1985) also examined the consequences of a
proposed EC  import duty.  Similar to  other studies on this topic,  the
authors used a linear programming model to simulate the effects  of a policy
on a country's feed rations.  Using France as a representative country, the
authors determined the results of an import duty using a two-part model.  A
linear programming model was developed to determine adjustments  in feed
rations resulting from the  increased soybean meal price.  Price
elasticities of feed demand were then calculated using a set of compound
feed demand equations.  This two-part model was  then used to  find the
impact on demand of soybean meal  (and feed) with successively higher  levels
of protection.
Peterson and Auerbach found that for small increases in meal prices
the decrease  in demand was moderate.  "For price increases  of 10%  or 20%,
the reduction in the demand of soybean meal  is  likely to range from about
3% to  7%"  (Peterson and Auerbach, 1985).  In general,  they found that  the
benefits of a restrictive soybean and meal import policy are much smaller
than previously thought.
However, the applicability of these results are limited since they
examine a single country.  France is  characterized by producing many of its
compound feed ingredients  internally.  Some of the Northern European
countries, in particular the Netherlands, depend on many imported feed
ingredients.  Because of soybean meal's relatively lower price, due to
zero-binding duty, imported beans and meal are relatively more important in
their feed rations than is  the case  in France.  Thus Dutch livestock
producers are more responsive to soybean price changes than French
producers.  Therefore, while this study may accurately estimate the
7situation in France, the results cannot be transferred to the  EC  as  a
whole.
In response  to the rising interest in the oil tax due  to EC expansion,
Davis, et. al.  (1986) studied the  impact of such a policy on U.S. soybean
exports.  The authors used a linear-in-logs equilibrium displacement model
with the analysis broken down into two sub-models for each trading region;
the EC and U.S.  One model was  for crushing services the other for
soybeans.  The EC  and U.S. models were connected through an international
price transmission elasticity.  The model employed five equations  for the
EC and four equations for the U.S. which defined supply and demand in terms
of percentage changes  for each market.  The equations were then solved for
percent change in price.
Davis,  et.  al. found that the change  in prices and quantities
supplied, demanded and traded of soybeans were minimally affected over a
range of possible tax levels and price transmission elasticities.  Crushing
services  in both regions were more responsive to the tax, especially at
higher tax rates.  Under the most extreme scenario, 200 ECU/mt tax and a .8
price transmission elasticity, EC imports  fell  .024 percent and world
prices fell by  .004 percent.  Thus the effectiveness of a consumption tax
must be questioned.
The underlying problem with Davis, et. al.'s  approach, as with other
studies, is  soybeans are assumed to be homogenous and the detailed
interactions among markets  are not explicitly allowed for.  First, soybeans
differ and hence are priced differently depending on origin and protein
content.  The partial equilibrium approach does not account for the
differentiated products.  Secondly the definite  interactions between
8soybeans and corn and livestock markets was not addressed in this approach.
The oilseed tax and its  effects on U.S. soybean exports was revisited
by Haniotis and Ames  (1988).  In this  case, U.S. exports  to the enlarged EC
was the  focus.  The authors addressed the previously ignored problem of
differentiated products using Armington's model of differentiated products
to determine soybean demand.
The results of this method indicate  significant changes  in U.S.
soybean exports given an oilseed tax for the enlarged EC.  Under the
assumption of EC enlargement with no tax, U.S. exports increase a mere  .91
percent.  But enlargement coupled with an oilseed tax would reduce exports
1.34 percent.  While Spain and Portugal  imports from the United States rise
2.29 percent, EC-10 imports  fall a significant 8.9 percent.  Although
avoiding some of the problems of the above  studies, the weakness of the
Haniotis and Ames approach is  the exclusion of livestock numbers,
explicitly or  implicitly, when estimating demand for soybeans.
Correcting for the exclusion of animal units in determining soybean
and soybean meal demand and other problems  and using the theoretical model
laid out in Houck, Ryan and Subotnik (1972),  Von Witzke and Houck (1987)
used a 29 equation model to describe the EC and world markets for soybeans,
meal and oil.  Using two stage least squares, the authors estimated 11
behavioral equations with data for 1969-1982.  Animal production was an
endogenous variable in determining meal demand.  The data, while not
including the most recent EC expansion of  1986,  includes  the development of
CAP and the EC.
Varying the tariff rate for soybean meal between 5% and 20%,  Von
Witzke and Houck found a tariff depressed world prices and raised EC
9prices.  Prices were most strongly affected in the meal market where the
tariff was imposed.  Except for large changes  in world bean and meal
prices, changes  in demand were small especially in the world market where
the elasticity of demand was estimated to be small.
An oil consumption tax ranging from 65 ECU/mt to 85 ECU/mt was  also
simulated in Von Witzke and Houck (1987).  The inelasticity of supply and
demand again render the effects small.  However, the EC oil price rises by
a substantial 11.1% to 14.5%.  Inexplicably soybean meal  is not affected.
It would be expected that shifting oil demand by the amount of the  tax
would shift bean demand since oil is  a product of bean crushing.  The
resulting fall in bean demand should lead to a decrease  in beans crushed
and thus meal supply.  The empirical results, however, do not include this
relationship or  the effects are  too small to be of significance.
The most recent work done on oilseed "rebalancing" is by Gleckler and
Tweeten (1990a and 1990b).  Their first paper addresses the termination of
EC oilseed subsidies and the second the impact of CAP rebalancing on the
United States,  EC and the rest of the world.  Employing the Economic
Research Service's  static world policy simulation modeling framework the
analysis goes beyond research done  in the past.  Key to this study is  that
the substitutability and complementarity relationships among commodities
are accounted for  in the world trade model.
The effects, of oilseed subsidy elimination, were small upward changes
in beef, pork and poultry world prices and substantial rises  in world
prices of oilseeds  and oilmeals.  EC consumption of the products examined
were hardly affected.  Production of oilseeds, however, was estimated to
fall  33 percent  in the EC while wheat production would rise 6 percent.  EC
10trade was most severely affected in these two commodities with net exports
of oilseeds falling 23 percent and wheat and coarse grains  rising 24 to  35
percent  (Gleckler and Tweeten, 1990a).
Effects on the United States are more tempered with production
changing from -.01 percent for pork to 1.4 percent for oilseeds;  oilseed
consumption falling by 1.06 percent and net exports changing between -4
percent  for coarse  grains and 8.16 percent for oilseeds.  Summed over all
commodities, welfare increased $339 million in the EC, decreased $12
million in U.S.  and increased $134 million in the rest of the world
(Gleckler and Tweeten, 1990a).
Gleckler and Tweeten (1990b) followed up  the oilseed subsidy study
with a look at the  impact of CAP rebalancing on the United States,  EC and
the rest of  the world.  In this study, the model was used to determine what
uniform level of support under rebalancing would be required to make U.S.
producers no worse off.  Examining uniform levels of support between 110
and 140 percent of world prices  (the actual weighted average  is  142 percent
above world prices)  the authors found that the 120 percent level would be
acceptable to the U.S. and rest of world on a change of producer surplus
basis.  The  EC producers, however, would lose $4,360 million.  As expected,
U.S. oilseed and oilmeal trade fell while wheat and corn trade rose.
Finally the net societal welfare effects for the  EC and U.S. were positive
at a 120 percent level of uniform support, while the rest of the world lost
(Gleckler and Tweeten, 1990b).
III. MARKET'STRUCTURE AND POLICIES OF SOYBEANS AND THEIR PRODUCTS
THE MARKET
The soybean and soybean product markets are highly interrelated by
11nature.  Houck, Ryan and Subotnik (1972)  developed a theoretical model
which helps explain the world market structure of soybeans and their
products.  This partial-equilibrium model has been used in several works,
including Von Witzke and Houck  (1987) and Meyers,  et. al.,  (1986),  to
explain the  interactions between markets  in response  to policy instruments.
The model allows for easy analysis  of trade policy effects on prices and
quantities between two regions.
Figure  1 illustrates  the model with the  EC importing beans and meal
and exporting oil.  The rows of individual graphs show the markets for
soybeans, soybean meal and soybean oil,  respectively.  The  outer columns
depict the markets  for the  EC and the United States while the center column
demonstrates the world market.  The graphs  are standard with price measured
on the vertical axis and quantity on the horizontal axis.
Let the discussion start from panel a, which depicts  the EC  retail and
derived demands for soybeans.  DEC  is  the retail demand curve  for soybeans
and is  the vertical summation of the soybean meal and oil demand curves,
DMEC and DOEC (panels d and g).  The second function in panel a is DEC',
the derived demand curve for soybeans  in the EC.  The  curve is  created by
subtracting the crushing margin and handling cost from retail demand.
The horizontal difference between SEC and DEC' in panel a is  ED;  the
excess demand curve in panel b.  ED interacts with the U.S. excess  supply
curve, ES,  to form the world price for soybeans.  ES  is  generated by the
horizontal difference between the U.S.  supply and demand curves in panel c.
The world soybean price then determines a quantity demanded of soybeans  in
the  EC.  This  quantity translates into the supply of soybean meal and oil
in the Community, since they are derived in technologically fixed
12Figure 1. Model for the EC-U.S. Soybean and Product Markets
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proportions. The  same occurs in the U.S. market.  Because of the technology
involved in crushing, these  supply curves are fixed for a given amount of
soybeans and thus are inelastic.
The same process is  portrayed in panels e and h for soybean meal and
oil, where the EC imports the  former and exports the  latter.  Thus,  the EC
has an excess demand curve for meal (EDM) and an excess supply curve for
oil  (ESO) which combines with the U.S. excess supply and demand curves to
create the  soybean meal and oil world prices.
The interactions outlined above characterize the standard partial-
equilibrium analysis model.  The change in consumer and producer surplus
will also be measured with this model.  This model serves as  the framework
13from which to  determine policy effects on prices and quantities, as well as
welfare.
EXISTING POLICIES
As mentioned in the  introduction, soybeans are often thought of as one
of the more freely traded agricultural commodities.  Indeed, global
producer subsidy equivalents  show oilseeds to be supported at approximately
15%  of producer income.  Food and feed grains are  subsidized between 25  and
40 percent, while sugar and dairy are between 45 and 55 percent  (Bickerton
and Glauber, 1990).  However, this does not mean that governments do not
intervene in the markets.  Some countries,  like the United States, have
little direct intervention into  their soybean and product markets, although
it  is  increasing.  Yet other countries, like the European Community and
Brazil,  intervene more substantially.
Because  of the European Community's rising use of imported soybean and
Figure  2. EC Oilseed Support Mechanism
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14soybean meal, the EC Commission was compelled in 1979  to  establish a
program to encourage production of soybeans where possible.  The Commission
sets a support price, called a target price, for soybeans.  Oilseed
crushers receive a subsidy equal  to  the difference between the target price
and the EC-calculated world price.  The  "subsidy is payable to  oilseed
processors as  compensation for purchasing domestically-produced oilseeds"
(GATT, 1990).  Soybean producers then receive payment from crushers  at
least as  large as  the  intervention price.  Refer to figure 2.
Producers  sell into  government intervention stocks when supply exceeds
demand.  In this case, they receive the intervention price, which is  set
slightly below the  guide or target price, and is  the price that triggers  EC
purchases. The sale  to  intervention stocks, however,  is rare.
This policy regime came under attack by the American Soybean
Association (ASA) in 1987.  The U.S. Trade Representative, acting on the
ASA's Section 301 petition, argued that the  subsidy level was calculated to
provide an incentive for EC processors  to buy domestic oilseeds rather than
imports.  The United States claimed  that the Dillon Round tariff
concessions had been "nullified and impaired" as a result of the
processor/producer  subsidy regime  (GATT, 1990).
The evidence was on the U.S.  side, for between 1977 and 1986, the
European Community support price for soybeans had been 50%  to 200%  above
the world price.  This rate of support gave producers, primarily those in
Italy and France, incentive to expand output from 8,000  tons  to 1.8 million
tons  from  1977  to  1987  (Bickerton and Glauber, 1990).  Despite  this rapid
increase in production, the absolute amount of output  is  small with EC
soybean production accounting for approximately one-tenth of EC demand.
15On January 25,  1990, the GATT council adopted the dispute-settlement
panel report on the U.S.-EC  soybean dispute.  The Council agreed with the
U.S. contention that the subsidy level  "over-compensated" processors  for
purchasing domestic oilseeds.  The panel conclusions that were accepted by
the Council were that the EC payments to processors were inconsistent with
GATT articles, that the subsidy regime had impaired the zero-binding duty
concessions and that GATT members should refrain from retaliation until the
EC had reasonable time to conform to GATT articles  (GATT, 1990).  Thus  in
an attempt to avoid full elimination of their oilseed program, the EC has
been trying to negotiate their  "rebalancing" proposal into the Uruguay
Round.
A GATT agreement that allowed the EC  to implement some form of
rebalancing would also attack the rising budgetary problems involved in EC
subsidies.  Because of  the open-ended support for soybeans and other
oilseeds, EC budget expenditures have risen rapidly.  Between 1984 and
1988,  EC budget expenditures  for oilseeds tripled.  This led to a
limitation on price cuts at  the February 1988 EC Summit.  To decrease EC
expenditures on oilseeds, production targets were established.  These
targets are called Maximum Guaranteed Quantities  (MGQ)  and are set at  the
beginning of each season.  Price penalties  go into effect when EC
production of soybeans, or other oilseeds or grains, exceeds the MGQ.  The
1988/89  to 1990/91 MGQ for soybeans is  1,300,000 tons for  the EC-12.  In
1988/89, the penalty for each 1 percent of production exceeding the MGQ was
a  .45 percent decrease in the support price.  In 1989/90 the penalty was a
.5  percent decrease.  These penalties, as of the February 1988 reforms, are
not limited in their magnitude  (Normile, 1989).
16The United States, on the other hand, does not support its soybean and
product  industries to the extent of the European Community.  As with U.S.
grains, soybean prices are  supported through a non-recourse  loan program.
Under the program the U.S. Department of Agriculture sets a loan rate at
which farmers can borrow.  When the loan is due producers have one of two
options.  If the market price  is below the loan rate, producers forfeit the
soybeans  they put up for collateral and take the loan rate.  The government
has no recourse against these forfeitures.  Of course if the market price
exceeds the  loan rate  the farmer can repay his loan and sell his soybeans
at the higher market price.  Unlike the grains, there are no deficiency
payments for soybeans.
In the  1990 farm bill, however, U.S.  soybeans were given more support
when a new marketing loan program was established for soybeans.  The
program allows producers to repay loans, not at  the loan rate, but at a
lower rate when the world price  is  less  than the established rate.  This
prevents the U.S. loan rate from acting as a price floor on the world
market.  The marketing loan is  essentially the  same as the EC's VES.
However, while vying for more governmental support, soybean growers
lost on the loan rate  side.  The  rate was set at $5.02 per bushel which was
lowered to $4.92 by a 2 percent assessment.  Merle N. (Buck) McCann,
president of ASA, says  "this farm bill just doesn't do enough to help us
recapture the markets we've lost"  (Agweek, 1990).  The effective loan rate
is viewed as being too low to cause a significant increase in U.S. soybean
production.
Meanwhile, soybean oil  is subject  to an import tariff and export
subsidies.  First, soybean oil  imports are  subject to a tariff rate  as high
17as 22.5 percent.  Soybean meal and flour is  subject to a nominal 3 percent
ad-valorem tariff rate.  Second, the  Export Enhancement Program  (EEP) is
used to encourage exports of  soybean oil, although the effectiveness of the
EEP program has been questioned.  The program awards  generic certificates
to exporters  that are redeemable  for Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
owned commodities.  These certificates are  then used to lower the per
gallon price of soybean oil.
In the United States,  the policies affecting grains also  impact
soybeans by discouraging their production.  Because wheat and coarse grain
producers are paid deficiency payments, farmers are encouraged to plant
these crops and not soybeans.
While both the U.S. and EC meddle in their soybean and product
markets, the commodities are considerably less  protected than other
commodities.  The remainder of this paper will examine how that tradition
is  at risk.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Turning from the policies which intervene on soybean and soybean
product markets today, we face  the theoretical world of examining the
effects of the possible policies of tomorrow.  Inherent behind the
following methodology is the market structure  introduced by Houck, Ryan and
Subotnik (1972) and outlined in section 3.
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN VARIABLES
Following the methods  in Alston (1985) and Davis,  et. al.  (1986) we
can arrive at the market variable changes  through elasticities.  By
breaking down the elasticity equation into its component parts, we can
solve for price or quantity changes.  Expressing the supply, demand, excess
18demand and supply functions, a market clearing equation and a price
transmission elasticity equation in terms of elasticities, we can describe
each market under the four scenarios with these five equations.
(1) dQij=ei(dPij-a)
(2)  dDj=n  ij (dPi  j-P)
(3)dTij  =eij(dPi  Y)
(4)  dD ij=KijdQ  ijtKi j  dTi 
(5)  dPi  t=  idp  -T
Where
dQij  - percentage change  in quantity supplied of the  ith product in the
jth country,
ij  - elasticity of supply for  i th commodity in jth  country,
dPij  - percentage change  in price of  ith product in jth  country,
a  - percent shift in supply caused by a policy tool,
dDi  - percentage change  in quantity demanded of ith product  in jth
country,
i  _  elasticity of demand of  ith  product in jth  country,
B  - percent shift in demand caused by policy tool,
dTij  - percentage change in quantity traded of ith  product in jth
country,
Ei (7ix)  - elasticity of excess  demand (excess supply) of ith product
(from) jth  country,
dPit  - percentage change in trading price of  ith product to  (from)  jth
country,
19y  - percent shift in excess supply or demand curve caused by a policy
tool,
Ki'  - percent of country j's consumption of  i satisfied by domestic
production,
Kit  - percent of country j's consumption of i satisfied by trade,
Ti - tariff rate  imposed on product i,
Ai - international price transmission elasticity of product i.
After solving the above equations for  dPij  in each market, the answer
is  then substituted into equations  (1) through (5) to determine the changes
in quantities traded, consumed and supplied.  Given the changes in price
and quantities which can be found from the preceding equations one can
proceed with examining the welfare effects.
WELFARE MEASUREMENT
Many economists have enumerated the inadequacies of consumer and
producer surplus, while others claim they can be fair approximations of
equivalent variation (EV) and compensating variation  (CV).  Freeman  (1979)
states  that EV does not provide a unique welfare measure when a policy
involves changes  in more than one price.  On the other hand, when more than
one policy is being evaluated in order to rank the options,  CV may fail  to
be consistent with individual preferences.  Although easier to calculate
than EV and CV, consumer surplus does not conform to the theoretical
definition of welfare change.
Considering these arguments and the conditions set by Willig (1976),
Harberger  (1971) and Mishan (1968)  for use of consumer and producer surplus
we find that all but one market conforms.  Farmers and crushers  are the
producers and consumers  in the soybean market.  Soybean production can be
20raised in the  short run only by adding inputs such as  fertilizer and water.
Thus we assume that  this market conforms to  the needs of producer surplus.
Crushers however, fail the expenditure assumption as soybeans are  likely to
be a large percent of their expenditures.
In the meal and oil markets,  crushers are the producers.  In the
crushing industry production can be increased in the short run only by
adding labor and chemicals;  these are very imperfect substitutes for the
fixed factor, soybeans.  Meanwhile, livestock producers are  the primary
consumer of soybean meal.  Meal  is  likely to make up only a small portion
of a producer's expenditure bundle.  Although households are the main
consumer of oil,  soybean oil will make up a very small portion of their
expenditures.
Thus,  the assumptions would appear to hold in every case,  except for
consumer surplus  in the soybean market.  Needing to be consistent across
markets, however, consumer and producer surplus would appear  to be a
reasonable approximation for the change in welfare experienced under these
policies.  This  is particularly true given the  shortfalls of EV and CV
explained by Freeman.
Proceeding with the above  information, the welfare effects  for each
market under the different policies can be determined.  The method used for
calculating the changes in welfare  is found in Bale and Lutz  (1981).
(6)NSLp  = 1/2[Q-ljQi (l+dQi  )]x[P  l-P  I(l+dPi )]
(7)NSLC  =  2[Di?-Dij(l+dD' i )]x[Pt3-Pi  (l+dP'  )]
21(8)Gp  =  ij  [P i j (l+ d P ij )- P i ]  -N S L p
(9)  G  =  D i '  [Pl (l+dPj)  -Pi]  -NSL c
(10)  Gg =  NSLp+NSL,+Gp+  G
Where NSLI  and NSL, are net social loss for producers and consumers,
respectively.  Gp,  Gc and G,  are  the changes  in surplus or welfare for
producers, consumers  and the government.
Solving for equations  (6) through (10)  gives us the gain or loss  in
producer, consumer and government surplus.  Summing equations  (8),  (9) and
(10)  over the ith country gives us  the net change  in societal welfare for
that country.
V. RESULTS
The data needs of this analysis are not extensive as seen in the last
section.  The first requirement  is elasticities estimates.  Several
researchers have painstakingly worked through small and large models and
derived elasticities  for the U.S. and EC soybean and soybean product
markets with the results differing widely.
Because of the comprehensive and respectable work done by the Food and
Agricultural Policy Research Institute  (FAPRI) I have chosen to use their
elasticity estimates.  These elasticities can be found in table  1.  The
FAPRI trade model for soybeans and their products  is based on the three
product, two region theoretical model established in Houck, Ryan and
Subotnik  (1972) and used in this analysis.  Where FAPRI  did not estimate an
elasticity, estimates from Von Witzke and Houck  (1987) and Davis et.  al.
22(1986) were used.  However, because of differing elasticity estimates of
various researchers I will perform a sensitivity analysis, varying the
elasticities by 20%,  to  see how the  results vary from the FAPRI base.
TABLE 1:  ELASTICITIES
BEANS  MEAL  OIL
eeb  0.84  Eem  1  Ee  1
r?\ b -0.55  e0 m -0.19  e  o 0  -0.363
Emb  1.57  m  0.41  eM o 0.363
m7b  -1.39  rm  -0.19  nxo  -0.4
;b  0.9  "  0.88  A0 0.8
EU'b  0.71  Eus  1  1u' o 1
7U'b  -0.86  nuu'  -0.41  rUU'  -0.45
Note:  Elasticities for excess supply and excess demand are derived from the
supply and demand elasticity estimates.
Source: Meyers et. al.,  (1986);  Von Witzke and Houck (1987) and Davis  et.
al  (1986).
Data on production, prices,  imports and exports were taken from
Toepfer 1989 and can be found in appendix Al.  The data used for  this
analysis is a three year average of the 1986/87 to 1988/89 marketing years.
An average was used to avoid single year anomalies and these particular
years were chosen as  they include the expansion of the European Community
from ten to twelve members  in 1986.  When the U.S. welfare changes were
calculated the U.S. trade data was prorated for the amount traded with the
EC.
SCENARIO  1:  CONSUMPTION TAX
Figure 3 depicts  the effects of a vegetable oil consumption tax on the
EC and U.S. markets.  The tax effectively decreases  the demand for soybean
oil at every price, thus shifting oil demand to the left by the amount of
the tax (panel g).  The  excess supply curve  in panel h then shifts to  the
23Figure 3. Scenario  1:  Consumption Tax in EEC Vegetable Oils.
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left by the  amount of the tax,  t  to ESO'.  This decreases  exports to t' and
pushes down the world price for soybean oil to Pw'.
Because DOEC + DMEC - DEC,  the new oil demand curve causes the retail
and derived demands for soybeans to fall to DEC' and DEC",  respectively.
The  EC supply of soybeans then falls  as fewer beans are imported (panels a
and b).  The fall  in available soybeans to crush causes  the excess demand
curve for soybean meal to rise to EDM' (panel e).  This  increase in the
excess demand for meal pushes  the world meal price up to Pw' and results in
increased EC meal imports  (panel e).  The decreased soybean supply also
causes  the excess supply for oil to shift back to the  left to ESO".  Thus
24exports of oil  decrease from t' to  t",  although more oil  is exported then
originally.
The effect on the United States is  rather straight forward since it is
assumed there has been no retaliation. The lower soybean world price
reduces U.S. soybean exports.  In panel f, the  increased world price of
meal leads  to an expansion of U.S. meal exports.
TABLE 2:  PERCENT CHANGE IN PRICE AND QUANTITY FOR EEC UNDER
SCENARIO 1;  75 ECU/mt OIL CONSUMPTION TAX.
BEAN MARKET  BASE  +20%  -20%
EEC PRICE  -1.1240  -0.9919  -1.2967
SUPPLY  -0.9442  -0.9999  -0.8714
DEMAND  -1.5220  -1.9136  -1.1416
IMPORTS  -1.5882  -2.0183  -1.1726
MEAL MARKET
EEC PRICE  0.8517  1.0260  0.6681
SUPPLY  -1.2054  -1.5156  -0.9042
DEMAND  -0.1618  -0.2339  -0.1016
IMPORTS  0.3073  0.5330  0.1543
OIL MARKET
EEC PRICE  -5.2695  -5.4738  -5.0672
SUPPLY  -0.2709  -0.3406  -0.2032
DEMAND  9.8485  11.9072  7.8200
EXPORTS  1.8970  2.8376  1.1675
Source:  Author's calculations.
The results seen in figure  3 are quantified in the empirical analysis
and are  found in tables  2 and 3.  Under the FAPRI baseline scenario, EC
soybean prices fall 1.1 percent, with meal prices rising a mere .85
percent.  See table 2.  The largest change  is  in the EC oil market where
price falls  5.3 percent.  These results are  as expected from the
25theoretical model and empirical work done by Davis,  et. al.  (1986)  and von
Witzke and Houck (1987).  The results however, are not desirable from an EC
standpoint as meal  imports rise contrary to EC goals.
The results for the United States under scenario  1 are  as expected
from Figure 3.  Table 3 enumerates the changes for each variable.  The U.S.
soybean price falls 1 percent, and the  oil price 4 percent.  U.S. trade in
soybeans and their products, however, are resilient to the effects of a
tax.  This is  especially true  in soybean oil since little oil  is  traded
between the United States  and EC.
TABLE 3:  PERCENT CHANGE IN PRICE AND QUANTITY FOR U.S. UNDER
SCENARIO 1;  75  ECU/mt OIL CONSUMPTION TAX.
BEAN MARKET  BASE  +20%  -20%
US PRICE  -1.0116  -1.0713  -0.9336
SUPPLY  -0.7182  -0.9127  -0.5303
DEMAND  0.8700  1.1056  0.6423
EXPORTS  -0.8613  -0.9122  -0.7949
MEAL MARKET
US  PRICE  0.7495  1.0834  0.4704
SUPPLY  0.6890  0.8756  0.5087
DEMAND  -0.3073  -0.5330  -0.1543
EXPORTS  0.0958  0.1149  0.0766
OIL MARKET
US  PRICE  -4.2156  -5.2549  -3.2430
SUPPLY  0.1549  0.1968  0.1143
DEMAND  1.8970  2.8376  1.1675
IMPORTS  0.0087  0.0131  0.0054
Source:  Author's calculations.
The welfare  effects of a consumption tax on vegetable oil  can be seen
in tables 4 and 5.  In table 4,  the  EC soybean market has a net gain in
26welfare of $33  million as measured here.  The meal market loses welfare
though not enough to greatly affect the EC.  The societal net gain in
welfare  for the  EC is  $13 million with the imposition of a 75  ECU tax on
vegetable oils.
TABLE 4:  WELFARE CHANGE FOR EEC UNDER SCENARIO 1;  75  ECU/mt
OIL CONSUMPTION TAX.  ($1,000)
BEAN MARKET  BASE  +20%  -20%
PRODUCER RENT  (3,888)  (3,432)  (4,483)
CONSUMER RENT  37,425  32,962  43,257
BUDGET SURPLUS  0  0  0
TOTAL RENT  33,537  29,530  38,774
MEAL MARKET
PRODUCER RENT  20,439  24,658  16,009
CONSUMER RENT  (42,301)  (50,935)  (33,191)
BUDGET SURPLUS  0  0  0
TOTAL RENT  (21,862)  (26,227)  (17,183)
OIL MARKET
PRODUCER RENT  (46,010)  (47,811)  (44,229)
CONSUMER RENT  34,286  35,965  32,651
BUDGET SURPLUS  13,271  13,786  12,761
TOTAL RENT  1,547  1,940  1,184
NET CHANGE IN
SOCIETY
SOCIETY1  _13,223  5,192  22,775
Source: Author's  calculations.
The U.S.  in table  5 realizes a net loss of $23 million in societal
welfare.  The producer welfare loss in the U.S. soybean market totals to
$112 million.  This  is a substantial loss which greatly affects  the U.S.
soybean and product sector for the worse.  Thus the United States  is
justified in  its protest against the oil consumption tax.
27TABLE  5:  WELFARE CHANGE FOR U.S. UNDER SCENARIO 1;  75
ECU/mt OIL CONSUMPTION TAX. ($1,000)
BEAN MARKET  BASE  +20%  -20%
PRODUCER RENT  (112,619)  (119,377)  (103,838)
CONSUMER RENT  85,584  90,738  78,895
TOTAL RENT  (27,035)  (28,639)  (24,943)
MEAL MARKET
PRODUCER RENT  36,952  53,364  23,210
CONSUMER RENT  (34,107)  (49,244)  (21,419)
TOTAL RENT  2,846  4,119  1,790
OIL MARKET
PRODUCER RENT  (97,541)  (121,563)  (75,052)
CONSUMER RENT  98,497  123,352  75,499
TOTAL RENT  956  1,789  446
NET CHANGE IN
SOCIETY
_SOCIETY  _(23,234)  (22,731)  (22,706)
Source: Author's calculations.
Although lately losing strength, the consumption tax on vegetable
oils,  from a budgetary standpoint, is quite appealing for the EC.  The  tax
generates revenue, approximately  $13 million in budget surplus  (table 4)
and releases  funds spent on oilseed and olive oil  support.  While voted
down by  the EC Commission several times  in the past, the tax will test  the
strength of budget cutters  in the political structure.  This  is  especially
true given that the  tax is  the only proposed policy which significantly
affects soybean oil prices and thus rising vegetable oil  support costs.
Nonetheless, EC soybean crushers will likely be unhappy with the
proposed tax, even though they gain $12 million in net welfare  (table 4).
It  is believed that the  EC crushing industry realizes great efficiencies
from economies of scale since they often import beans, crush them and
28export them again.  EC crushers may argue against  the tax, for  it would
decrease  their crushing quantities and put them in jeopardy of losing their
economy of scale  efficiencies.  Livestock producers would also oppose this
plan since they would be facing higher soybean meal and thus feed prices.
They in fact lose approximately $42 million in welfare  (table 4).
Furthermore the decision to employ a consumption tax is  dependent on
the political reaction of the United States.  As the Congressional excerpt
in section 1 makes clear, U.S. policy makers want no part of rebalancing.
From the work in this volume, the United States would realize a net loss of
$23  million (table 5) under this proposal.  Much of that loss,  $112
million, comes  from farmers.  The heavy support for farmers  in the United
States  is not likely to allow such a loss  to occur without retaliatory
action.
SCENARIO 2:  SOYBEAN AND MEAL TARIFF
Figure 4 depicts the theoretical consequences of a soybean meal and
equivalent soybean tariff on EC and U.S. markets.  A tariff will shift the
excess demand curves for soybeans and meal to the left by the  amount of the
tariff, t (panels b and e).  This  creates a higher domestic price, Pw+T in
both markets, which decreases  the demand for soybeans and meal.  The higher
price of EC meal leads  to decreased imports of soybean meal, t'  (panel e).
Because the  oil market  is technologically linked to the soybean and
meal markets, oil prices and quantities demanded change.  The smaller
supply of soybeans means a smaller supply of oil, causing the price of oil
on the world market to be pushed upward to  Pw'.  This price rise decreases
the quantity exported of oil to  t' (panel h).
The effect of the  tariffs on the United States can be found in panels
29Figure 4. Scenario 2:  Import Tariff on Soybean Meal and Equivalent
Tariff on Soybeans.
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c,  f  and  i  of  figure  4.  Because  of  the distorting  effects  of the  tariffs
in the soybean and meal markets  and decreased demand for  imports  in the EC,
U.S. producers and consumers face  lower world prices.  This means reduced
exports of soybeans and meal.  The soybean oil market faces a higher world
price, generating a decrease in the quantity of oil demanded  (panel i),
meaning the United States will import  less soybean oil.
The results of a 20 percent meal tariff yielded results roughly
consistent with those found by Huyser and Meyers  (1985) and Von Witzke and
Houck  (1987).  The EC  results for scenario 2 can be found in table 6.  The
import tariffs yield large changes  in EC soybean and meal prices, 8.9  and
2.8 percent  increases, respectively.  EC imports of these goods  are equally
30affected with large decreases  of 6 and 7 percent for soybeans  and meal.
The oil market in this  case  is minimally affected due to  its  inelastic
nature.
TABLE 6:  PERCENT CHANGE IN PRICE AND QUANTITIES FOR EEC UNDER
SCENARIO  2;  20%  SOYMEAL TARIFF AND EQUIVALENT SOYBEAN TARIFF.
BEAN MARKET  BASE  +20%  -20%
EEC PRICE  8.9108  7.8637  10.2796
SUPPLY  7.4851  7.9266  6.9079
DEMAND  -4.9009  -5.1900  -4.5230
IMPORTS  -6.3201  -6.6929  -5.8328
MEAL MARKET
EEC PRICE  2.8011  2.5609  3.1044
SUPPLY  -3.8815  -4.1105  -3.5822
DEMAND  -0.5322  -0.5839  -0.4719
IMPORTS  -7.1894  -8.5095  -5.8431
OIL MARKET
EEC PRICE  0.6404  0.6782  0.5911
SUPPLY  -0.8724  -0.9238  -0.8051
DEMAND  -0.2325  -0.2954  -0.1716
EXPORTS  -0.2306  -0.3516  -0.1362
Source:  Author's calculations.
The United States,  in table 7, is hit relatively hard due  to the
proposed 20 percent tariff.  The high tariff creates a large wedge between
the EC and U.S. as prices for soybeans  fall 4 percent and 17.5 percent for
meal.  Soybean and meal exports fall by 3 and 2 percent respectively.  The
U.S. oil market is  relatively immune to  intervention in the soybean and
meal markets with trade falling by a mere  .0011 percent.
31TABLE  7:  PERCENT CHANGE IN PRICE AND QUANTITIES FOR U.S.
UNDER SCENARIO 2;  20%  SOYMEAL TARIFF AND EQUIVALENT SOYBEAN
TARIFF.
BEAN MARKET  BASE  +20%  -20%
US PRICE  -4.0255  -3.7412  -4.8084
SUPPLY  -2.8581  -3.1875  -2.7312
DEMAND  3.4620  3.8609  3.3082
EXPORTS  -3.0848  -3.7018  -2.4679
MEAL MARKET
US PRICE  -17.5351  -17.2957  -17.8145
SUPPLY  2.7419  3.0579  2.6201
DEMAND  7.1894  8.5095  5.8431
EXPORTS  -2.2409  -2.6891  -1.7927
OIL MARKET
US PRICE  0.5124  0.6511  0.3783
SUPPLY  0.6162  0.6872  0.5889
DEMAND  -0.2306  -0.3516  -0.1362
IMPORTS  -0.0011  -0.0013  -0.0008
Source: Author's calculations.
The welfare effects of a 20  percent soybean meal and equivalent
soybean tariff can be found in table 8.  The price rises  in all  three EC
markets lead to  increases in producer surplus and more importantly budget
surplus.  The EC would in fact see a budget gain of $492 million in tariff
revenue.  The large budgetary  surplus out weighs the losses  in consumer
surplus for a net EC  gain of $161 million.  Thus  the appeal of the  import
tariffs.
32TABLE 8:  WELFARE CHANGE FOR EEC UNDER SCENARIO 2;  20%
SOYMEAL TARIFF AND EQUIVALENT SOYBEAN TARIFF. ($1,000)
BEAN MARKET  BASE  +20%  -20%
PRODUCER RENT  29,528  25,998  34,166
CONSUMER RENT  (291,644)  (256,991)  (337,096)
BUDGET SURPLUS  419,849  370,512  484,344
TOTAL RENT  157,734  139,520  181,414
MEAL MARKET
PRODUCER RENT  68,111  62,340  75,376
CONSUMER RENT  (138,854)  (126,914)  (153,938)
BUDGET SURPLUS  72,411  66,201  80,253
TOTAL RENT  1,667  1,627  1,690
OIL MARKET
PRODUCER RENT  5,609  5,941  5,175
CONSUMER RENT  (3,967)  (4,200)  (3,662)
BUDGET SURPLUS  0  0  0
TOTAL RENT  1,642  1,742  1,512
NET CHANGE IN
SOCIETY
__SOCIETY  _161,043  142,888  184,617
Source:  Author's calculations.
In table  9, the United States sees a net loss under scenario 2 of $112
million.  All three U.S. markets experience net losses, even the minimally
effected U.S. oil sector.  Unlike the consumption tax, the  tariff not only
decreases use of soybean oil, but the instrument also decreases the  imports
of soybean meal.  The tax was unable to do this.
However, a tariff on soybeans and soybean meal would have many
political enemies within the EC.  EC crushers would likely oppose the
tariff since  they will lose heavily from higher soybean prices.  Table 8
indicates crushers will realize a net loss of $217 million over all three
markets.
33TABLE 9:  WELFARE CHANGE FOR U.S. UNDER SCENARIO  2;  20%
SOYMEAL TARIFF AND EQUIVALENT SOYBEAN TARIFF.  ($1,000)
BEAN MARKET  BASE  +20%  -20%
PRODUCER RENT  (452,9x)  (421,622)  (540,672)
CONSUMER RENT  368,370  343,024  439,676
TOTAL RENT  (84,558)  (78,598)  (100,996)
MEAL MARKET
PRODUCER RENT  (855,583)  (842,553)  (869,754)
CONSUMER RENT  827,864  821,767  835,592
TOTAL RENT  (27,719)  (20,786)  (34,162)
OIL MARKET
PRODUCER RENT  11,828  15,025  8,734
CONSUMER RENT  (11,845)  (15,043)  (8,749)
TOTAL RENT  (17)  (18)  (16)
NET CHANGE IN
SOCIETY_  ___(112,294)  (99,402)  (135,174)
Source: Author's calculations.
The EC livestock and dairy industry would also resist a tariff.  Not
only would feed grain prices be high, but soybean meal prices would also be
higher, increasing total feed cost.  Livestock and dairy producers face a
$138  million loss in consumer surplus.  (Table 8).  The already heavily
supported dairy producers would object to the higher  feed prices and most
likely ask for greater protection. Since both the tax and the tariff
increase feed prices, these policies would also contribute to a decrease in
surplus dairy production if dairy farmers were not compensated (Peterson
and Auerbach, 1985).
The United States' retaliation is  likely to be higher in the case of a
tariff given the large potential losses in welfare  ($112 million in table
349),  the higher price volatility from intervention and the violation of the
zero-binding duty concession.  The EC will have to weigh the consequences
of higher U.S.-EC trade tensions.
SCENARIO  3:  DECREASED SUPPORT PRICE FOR FEED GRAINS
Figure 5. Scenario 3:  Consequences of a Decrease in the EEC Feed Grain
Support Price.
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Figure 5 illustrates the effects of a decreased feed grain support
price.  In panel d, the demand for meal decreases  as the price for the
substitute  feed grains fall.  Because  of the  relationship between the
markets,  soybean demand at  the retail and farm-gate  levels fall  (panel a).
The decreases  in soybeans  and meal demand lead to a decrease  in excess
35demand in both markets  (panels b and e).  The decreased demand pushes down
world market prices for soybeans  and meal and hence lowers  EC imports  in
both markets.  Again the reduced demand for soybeans  means a smaller supply
of EC  soybean oil which drives up the price in this market and causes  EC
exports  to fall.
Since government intervention has been reduced in this case, U.S.
producers and consumers will face virtually the  same price as  the producers
and consumers in the  EC.  Therefore,  the United States  is exposed to new
lower prices  in the soybean and meal markets (panels c and f),  and a higher
TABLE  10:  PERCENT CHANGE IN PRICE AND QUANTITY FOR EEC UNDER
SCENARIO 3;  30% DECREASE IN CORN THRESHOLD PRICE.
BEAN MARKET  BASE  +20%  -20%
EEC PRICE  -1.7158  -1.5142  -1.9793
SUPPLY  -1.4413  -1.5263  -1.3301
DEMAND  -2.3233  -2.9211  -1.7427
IMPORTS  -2.4244  -3.0809  -1.7900
MEAL MARKET
EEC PRICE  -2.6914  -2.8324  -2.5455
SUPPLY  -1.8401  -2.3135  -1.3802
DEMAND  -0.9136  0.6458  0.3869
IMPORTS  -0.9711  -1.4716  -0.5878
OIL MARKET
EEC PRICE  0.3036  0.3760  0.2312
SUPPLY  -0.4136  -0.5199  -0.3102
DEMAND  -0.1102  -0.1638  -0.0672
EXPORTS  -0.1093  -0.1949  -0.0533
Source:  Author's calculations.
price in the soybean oil market  (panel i).  The United States will face
lower exports of soybeans and meal while their imports  of oil will fall.
36The consequences of decreasing the support price for feed grains are
similar  to  those found by Huyser and Meyers  (1985).
The empirical results of a 30% decrease  in the corn support price are
found in tables 10  and 11.  The cross price elasticity for EC  corn and
soybean meal  is  .25 (Meyers et.  al.,  1986).  In table 10,  the  EC realizes  a
2 percent decrease  in soybean prices  and a 3 percent fall  in meal prices.
In both markets,  imports fall by 2.4 percent for soybeans  and  .97 percent
for meal.  The  EC oil market is nominally affected.  The United States, in
table 11,  is affected in much the  same way.  U.S. soybean and meal prices
fall 1.5 and 2.4 percent respectively.  Exports also fall.  Again soybean
oil variables are  left virtually the  same.
TABLE  11:  PERCENT  CHANGE IN PRICE AND QUANTITY FOR U.S. UNDER SCENARIO  3;  30% DECREASE IN CORN THRESHOLD PRICE.
BEAN MARKET  BASE  +20%  -20%
US  PRICE  -1.5442  -1.7661  -1.0261
SUPPLY  -1.0964  -1.5047  -0.5828
DEMAND  1.3280  1.8226  0.7060
EXPORTS  -1.1833  -1.4200  -0.9467
MEAL MARKET
US PRICE  -2.3685  -2.9910  -1.7920
SUPPLY  1.0518  1.4435  0.5591
DEMAND  0.9711  1.4716  0.5878
EXPORTS  -0.3027  -0.4587  -0.1832
OIL MARKET
US PRICE  0.2429  0.3610  0.1480
SUPPLY  0.2364  0.3244  0.1257
DEMAND  -0.1093  -0.1949  -0.0533
IMPORTS  -0.0005  -0.0009  -0.0002
Source:  Author's calculations.
37The welfare effects  for the EC under scenario 3 can be  found in table
12.  This trade liberalizing policy in fact makes  the EC better off in the
net without hurting consumers as much as  the scenario 2 import tariffs.
The Common Market gains $120  million primarily from the rise  in consumer
surplus  in the soybean and meal markets.
TABLE 12:  WELFARE CHANGE FOR EEC UNDER SCENARIO 3;  30%
DECREASE IN CORN THRESHOLD PRICE. ($1,000).
BEAN MARKET  BASE  +20%  -20%
PRODUCER RENT  (5,949)  (5,252)  (6,859)
CONSUMER RENT  56,898  50,060  65,831
BUDGET SURPLUS  0  0  0
TOTAL RENT  50,949  44,808  58,972
MEAL MARKET
PRODUCER RENT  (64,789)  (68,343)  (61,136)
CONSUMER RENT  133,164  141,236  126,766
BUDGET SURPLUS  0  0  0
TOTAL RENT  68,375  72,894  65,629
OIL MARKET
PRODUCER RENT  2,653  3,287  2,019
CONSUMER RENT  (1,882)  (2,330)  (1,433)
BUDGET SURPLUS  0  0  0
TOTAL RENT  771  957  586
NET CHANGE IN
SOCIETY  120,094  118,659  125,187
Source:  Author's calculations.
Meanwhile  the United States  realizes a loss in table 13.  The United
States  indeed loses $49 million mostly from producers in the soybean and
meal markets.  This definite  loss of social welfare is  somewhat ironic
since  this  is  the  one policy the United States  is  supporting.
Nevertheless,  it  is reasonable that the United States would support this
38policy since  decreased price  supports would be a definitive move towards
liberalized trade by the  EC.  Furthermore, U.S.  feed grain producers would
be better off as world feed grain prices would rise  (see figure 6) and U.S.
producers would become relatively more competitive against the EC's
subsidized exports.
In Figure 6, the budgetary effects  of a decrease  in the feed grain
support price is  depicted.  The graph shows the world market  for feed
grains with the  EC as  an exporter.  ES  is  the excess supply curve for  the
EC and ED is  the excess demand curve for the rest of the  importing world.
When the  support price  is  at Ps,  the EC's budgetary outlays  for a variable
export subsidy are  Ps - P1  per unit.  Yet if the EC were  to decrease its
support price on feed grains  to  Ps',  the resulting world price would be P2.
Hence, the EC would be expending Ps' - P2 per unit and would gain the
shaded area in budgetary surplus.  This exercise only reinforces the fact
that a decrease  in feed grain price supports would result in a net welfare
gain to  the EC.
Figure 6. Budget Gains  From a Decrease  the Feed Grain Support Price.
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The decreased feed grain price support  levels, would meet great
39protest by EC feed grain producers as  they would be facing lower prices.
However, feed grain support prices have recently been lowered in the face
of decreasing budgetary costs, although it remains  to be seen how far
prices can be cut before farmer's objections are given more weight than
they now have.
Livestock producers would, however, hail this proposal, as  feed prices
would be lowered significantly.  Not only do grain and meal prices fall,
but producers realize a $133 million gain in consumer surplus from the fall
in soybean meal prices.  The  EC would also be confident that the United
States would not retaliate even though the U.S. loses welfare  in the
soybean and product markets.
TABLE 13:  WELFARE CHANGE FOR U.S. UNDER SCENARIO 3;  30%
DECREASE IN CORN THRESHOLD PRICE. ($1,000).
BEAN MARKET  BASE  +20%  -20%
PRODUCER RENT  (172,234)  (197,385)  (114,154)
CONSUMER RENT  130,940  150,124  86,738
TOTAL RENT  (41,294)  (47,261)  (27,416)
MEAL MARKET
PRODUCER RENT  (116,554)  (146,901)  (88,406)
CONSUMER RENT  108,464  137,315  81,409
TOTAL RENT  (8,090)  (9,586)  (56,496)
OIL MARKET
PRODUCER RENT  5,618  8,345  3,245
CONSUMER RENT  (5,619)  (8,347)  (3,424)
TOTAL RENT  (1)  (2)  0
NET CHANGE IN
SOCIETY  (49,386)  (56,848)  (33,912)
Source:  Authors' calculations.
40SCENARIO 4:  TARIFF AND DECREASE IN FEED GRAIN SUPPORT PRICE
The most plausible policy from an EC standpoint  is  a combination of
scenarios 2 and 3.  Figure 7 depicts  the  effects of import tariffs on
soybean and soybean meal and a decrease  in the feed grain support price.
As can be seen in figure 7, this policy causes many functions  to shift and
many feedback reactions.  Briefly the decreased support price shifts DMEC
and EDM to the left as  feed grains and soybean meal are substitutes.  Since
Figure 7. Scenario 4:  Import Tariff and Decrease in EEC Feed Grain
Support Price.
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DMEC is  a  component  of  soybean  demand  DEC, DEC' and  ED  fall  as  well.  The
41soybean and meal tariffs are  then placed on top of these shifts, resulting
in further decreases in soybean and meal excess demand.  After all  the
functions have  shifted, the final result should be slight increases  in EC
soybean and product prices.  World prices of soybeans and meal should fall
while EC  imports and U.S. exports also fall.
TABLE 14:  PERCENT CHANGE IN PRICE AND QUANTITY FOR EEC
UNDER SCENARIO 4;  10%  SOYMEAL TARIFF AND 15%  DECREASE IN
CORN THRESHOLD PRICE.
BEAN MARKET  BASE  +20%  -20%
EEC PRICE  2.2930  2.0236  2.6453
SUPPLY  1.9262  2.0398  1.7776
DEMAND  -2.8947  -3.2958  -2.4707
IMPORTS  -3.4470  -3.9071  -2.9575
MEAL MARKET
EEC PRICE  0.3728  0.1869  0.5864
SUPPLY  -2.2926  -2.6102  -1.9568
DEMAND  -0.7833  -0.0426  -0.0891
IMPORTS  -3.9655  -4.8229  -3.1446
OIL MARKET
EEC PRICE  0.3783  0.4242  0.3278
SUPPLY  -0.5153  -0.5866  -0.4398
DEMAND  -0.1373  -0.1848  -0.0952
EXPORTS  -0.1362  -0.2199  -0.0755
Source:  Author's Calculations,
Table 14 and 15 substantiate these theoretical results.  The EC  soybean
price rises  2.3 percent while meal and oil prices both rise a mere  .37
percent.  See table 14.  Indeed EC imports  of soybeans and meal  fall 3.4
and 3.97 percent, respectively.  Again the oil market is  minimally
affected.
The United States,  in contrast, faces large decreases  in soybean and
42meal prices;  2 and 9.7 percent respectively.  U.S.  trade  is  reduced by 1.7,
1.2  and  .0006 percent in soybeans, meal and oil.  See table  15.
Finally the welfare effects of this  "rebalancing"  policy can be seen
in tables 16  and 17.  The combination of policies would result in an EC
gain of $41 million.  Most of the gain is  from tariff revenues.
TABLE 15:  PERCENT CHANGE IN PRICE AND QUANTITY FOR U.S.
UNDER SCENARIO 4;  10%  SOYMEAL TARIFF AND 15%  DECREASE IN
CORN THRESHOLD PRICE.
BEAN MARKET  BASE  +20%  -20%
US PRICE  -2.1956  -1.8990  -2.8880
SUPPLY  -1.5588  -1.6179  -1.6404
DEMAND  1.8882  1.9598  1.9869
EXPORTS  -1.6825  -2.0190  -1.3460
MEAL MARKET
US PRICE  -9.6719  -9.8027  -9.5872
SUPPLY  1.4954  1.5521  1.5736
DEMAND  3.9655  4.8229  3.1446
EXPORTS  -1.2360  -1.5033  -0.9802
OIL MARKET
US PRICE  0.3026  0.4073  0.2098
SUPPLY  0.3361  0.3488  0.3537
DEMAND  -0.1362  -0.2199  -0.0755
IMPORTS  -0.0006  -0.0010  -0.0003
Source: Author's calculations.
The United States, on the other hand, loses from  this combination of
policies.  In fact the United States  loses $68 million.  See  table  17.  The
bean and meal markets are greatly affected with large producer loses and
consumer gains.
While scenarios 1, 2, and 3 have all been suggested and even voted on
in the case of the consumption tax, they are not likely  to be implemented
43in their absolute forms.  First of all,  the  tax and tariff would certainly
be attacked by the United States as violating GATT.  On the other hand,
decreasing the support price on feed grains to  affect soybeans  and their
TABLE 16:  WELFARE CHANGE FOR EEC UNDER SCENARIO 4;  10%  SOYMEAL
TARIFF AND 15% DECREASE IN CORN THRESHOLD PRICE. ($1,000).
BEAN MARKET  BASE  +20%  -20%
PRODUCER RENT  7,818  6,895  9,026
CONSUMER RENT  (75,821)  (66,775)  (87,657)
BUDGET SURPLUS  108,041  95,345  124,638
TOTAL RENT  40,038  35,465  46,007
MEAL MARKET
PRODUCER RENT  8,994  4,515  14,123
CONSUMER RENT  (18,457)  (9,286)  (29,132)
BUDGET SURPLUS  9,637  4,830  15,158
TOTAL RENT  175  60  150
OIL MARKET
PRODUCER RENT  3,307  3,710  2,865
CONSUMER RENT  (2,344)  (2,628)  (2,032)
BUDGET SURPLUS  0  0  0
TOTAL RENT  963  1,082  833
NET CHANGE IN
SOCIETY  ^41,175  36,607  46,989
Source:  Author's calculations.
products significantly would be met with great protest by EC  grain
producers.  The riots and protests recently in Brussels  and Paris  indicate
the deep aversion to such a policy among EC producers.
Given the limitations of each policy, the realistic solution to the
EC's problem is  a combination of policies, likely a tariff and a lower  feed
grain support price negotiated in the Uruguay Round.  EC policy makers and
trade negotiators will face the  same pro and con arguments as  outlined
44before.  Yet the clamor by EC  interest groups and the U.S. may not be as
TABLE  17:  WELFARE CHANGE FOR U.S. UNDER SCENARIO 4;  10%  SOYMEAL TARIFF AND 15%  DECREASE IN CORN THRESHOLD PRICE.  ($1,000).
BEAN MARKET  BASE  +20%  -20%
PRODUCER RENT  (245,448)  (212,356)  (322,986)
CONSUMER RENT  186,690  159,530  245,687
TOTAL RENT  (58,758)  (50,826)  (77,299)
MEAL MARKET
PRODUCER RENT  (474,902)  (481,184)  (470,556)
CONSUMER RENT  449,526  457,518  443,794
TOTAL RENT  (25,376)  (23,667)  (26,762)
OIL MARKET
PRODUCER RENT  6,996  9,414  4,850
CONSUMER RENT  (6,999)  (9,416)  (4,855)
TOTAL RENT  (4)  (2)  (4)
NET CHANGE IN
SOCIETY  (84,138)  (74,495)  (104,066)
Source:  Author's calculations.
loud.  A 10%  tariff on soybean meal and a 15%  decrease in the corn support
price restricts EC soybean and soybean meal imports more than a 30%
decrease in corn support price, while imposing a smaller consumer welfare
loss in the EC than a 20%  tariff.
Scenario 4 is also more appealing  to EC leaders because  it will have
to be negotiated under GATT and thus avoids foreign trade retaliation.
However, the policy must be negotiated.  The U.S. and CAIRNS group may not
allow such a policy bargain and have  in fact already objected to this
proposal.  Even if agreed upon in Geneva Congressional sentiment may lead
to a defeat of the GATT package.
45SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Because estimation techniques  for elasticities differ between studies,
I varied the elasticity values by 20 percent to  determine how sensitive  the
variables were to elasticity values.  To determine the variability of each
of the 47 variables  I constructed 95  percent confidence intervals around
their means.  Refer to  appendix A2  for actual intervals.
The percent change for EC and U.S. prices and quantities tend to vary
within a narrow interval.  For example, the confidence  interval for  the
percent change  in EC  soybean price  is  (1.22, 3.020).  The narrow intervals
indicate that elasticities have little effect on the percentage change in
price and quantities.
The welfare variables, however, are characterized by large confidence
intervals.  For example, EC soybean meal consumer  surplus has a 95 percent
confidence interval of  (-37,376, 3736)  in millions  of dollars.  Thus  95
percent of such intervals would include  the  true value for EC soybean meal
consumer surplus.  The wider  intervals for the welfare measures  indicate
that the elasticity estimates are important to the accuracy of the welfare
estimate.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Having enumerated the empirical results and political realities of
each scenario, what is  the  "best" policy per the results found in section
5?  Table 18  summarizes the societal welfare changes for each scenario.
The  import tariff on soybean meal and beans provides the largest net
welfare  gain of the four;  $161 million.  But this gain masks  the loss of
$435 million in EC consumer surplus.
46TABLE 18:  SUMMARY OF SOCIETAL WELFARE RESULTS  (MILLION $)
EEC  U.S.
SCENARIO 1  $13  -$23
SCENARIO 2  $161  -$112
SCENARIO 3  $120  -$49
SCENARIO 4  $41  -$84
Source: Author's calculations.
The consumption tax, meanwhile, would appear to be the  least appealing
alternative with a net gain of $13 million.  Remember from table 2, the
consumption tax also  raised soybean meal imports, only intensifying the
competition between meal and feed grains.
A 30 percent  decrease in the corn support price  level appears  the  most
appealing option from a welfare perspective.  The net gain is  $120 million
for the EC, yet the  losses are only $73 million.  Of course when accounting
for political realities,  scenario 4 is  the most likely to be  implemented.
The United States, on the  other hand, would be best off with a
consumption tax since there  is  little  trade  in soybean oil between the
United States and EC.  The tariff, because of its  protectionist bias,  gives
the U.S.  its biggest welfare loss of all  four options.  The trade
liberalizing policies would bring losses to the U.S. soybean and product
markets as  well, yet would likely benefit substitute markets.
This paper has examined the impacts of four policy scenarios
concerning EC-U.S.  soybean and product trade.  While the United States
politically favors a scenario like  the third,  the EC is  likely to bargain
for an option more similar  to scenario 4.  The  idea of the  EC decreasing
price supports at all was unthinkable a year ago.  However,  an increasing
47CAP budget, rising EC stocks, economic and monetary union, and Community
enlargement are leading to increasing EC  sentiment to reform the CAP.  For
example, EC farm spending is expected to  rise to  32 billion ECU in 1991,
accounting for 60 percent of the EC budget, and to rise another  12.5
percent in 1992.  Furthermore, stocks  of EC beef, butter, skimmed milk, and
cereals are rising rapidly (Gardner, 1991).
Internal political pressures have also spurred sentiment for CAP
reform.  The CAP  is a disaggregating policy for the EC.  Similar to  the
United States,  the  EC's farm policy results  in 20 percent of EC producers
receiving 80 percent of  the farm budget.  Because farmers in each country
have varying degrees of efficiency, farm policy benefits are spread
unevenly over the  12  EC countries.  In addition, the possible enlargement
of the EC to include European Free Trade Area  (EFTA) countries  and even
eastern-European countries presents  some difficulties  for the current CAP.
The prospect of heavy grain producing states such as Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia joining the EC means that the CAP will have to be reformed
as the structure of EC agriculture changes further (Gardner, 1991).
In response to these pressures, the EC agricultural commissioner, Ray
MacSharry, has proposed reforms which would cut target prices by up to 50%,
eliminate  the MGQ and other regimes which discourage production and pay
small farmers regardless  of output  (Agweek, 1991).  The EC Commission
recently approved a "reflection paper"  presented by Mr. MacSharry, which
was then sent to the EC Council for further debate (Krucoff, 1991).
In the paper, Mr. MacSharry developed a reform proposal which
addresses the  growing difficulties of rising stocks,  the environment and
ineffective income policies.  To increase the competitive position of EC
48cereal grains,  target price levels would be cut substantially.  Production
controls would be eliminated as well.  EC farmers, however, would not be
left to the woes of the market.  Farmers would be compensated on a per
hectare basis with a fixed amount determined by market and stock
conditions.
Full compensation would apply up to a certain level of area.
Partial compensation would apply thereafter.  Beyond a certain
size the payment of the aid per hectare would be conditional on
the withdrawal from production of part of the area devoted to
arable crops...(Krucoff,  1991).
A similar regime would be developed for the livestock sector.  Milk quotas
would be reduced and sugar, tobacco and mutton would also be reformed
similar  to the cereal sector.
The implementation of such a proposal would go a long way to ending
the GATT stalemate.  If the EC Council approved the plan, other countries
would likely increase their pace  of agricultural policy reform, including
the United States.  World agriculture under GATT would thus,  look very
different than it does  today.  Not only would the new EC proposal  act as  a
starting place for an extensive GATT agreement to liberalize agricultural
trade, but grain and oilseed prices would likely rise.
In particular, the price and quantity changes  for the soybean and
product  sectors would be similar to the results found in section 5 for
scenario 3.  However, the changes are  likely to be more dramatic as the
proposed decrease in price supports  is larger  than those simulated here and
more feed and cereal grains are affected.  Furthermore, a cut  in the target
price of oilseeds would discourage production  in the  EC and further raise
world soybean prices.
Of course  it  is  likely that the proposal will be rejected.  At a two-
49day meeting  in early February 1991,  a small majority of the  12  farm
ministers opposed the plan (AgWeek, 1991).  Without approval  it  is  likely
that no  GATT agreement will materialize.  If this  is  the case,  the
agricultural trade war will escalate.  Not only would U.S.  "snapback"
provisions established in the 1990 farm bill  induce increased export
subsidies, but  it  is likely that the  EC would retaliate by eliminating the
Dillon Round concessions.
The dilemma in which the  EC finds  itself concerning the soybean and
product markets is  only a symptom of the greater illness of the CAP.  The
CAP no longer serves the  small farmer of Europe nor does it encourage
environmental conservation.  The  regime is becoming more costly and less
effective and will become more  so as  the EC expands.  Indeed the CAP  is  in
dire need of total reform.
Although soybeans and their products have aggravated CAP difficulties,
the problems are  in reality due to the changing structure of agriculture
and the  EC.  However, soybeans  and their products have  taken the blame so
much that many CAP reform proposals have centered around these sectors.
Those proposals have included a consumption tax on vegetable  oils, a tariff
on soybeans and soybean meal, a decrease in the support price of feed
grains and a mixed policy including a tariff and decreased price supports.
The simplicity of the partial equilibrium, three product, two country
model used here and consumer and producer surplus leads to shortfalls  in
measurement.  Nonetheless, the results  give the reader a general  idea of
what can be expected.  In light of the recent developments  in the EC,  I
would not suggest applying a more rigorous model to the scenarios examined
50here.  Instead, the new proposal could have profound affects on the  EC and
U.S.  soybean and products markets,  that warrant  investigation because of
the growing importance of soybeans and their products in world trade.
51APPENDIX  Al:  DATA
3 YEAR  3 YEAR
AVERAGE  AVERAGE
SOYBEAN PRODUCTION  SOYBEAN EXPORTS
USA  49083333  USA  18980000
EC-12  1456667  EC-12  0
SOYBEAN IMPORTS  SOYBEAN MEAL PRODUCTION
USA  0  USA  24410000
EC-12  12740000  EC-12  10266667
SOYBEAN MEAL EXPORTS  SOYBEAN MEAL NET IMPORTS
USA  5713333  USA  0
EC-12  1613333  EC-12  11126667
SOYBEAN OIL PRODUCTION  SOYBEAN OIL EXPORTS
USA  5661667  USA  683333
EC-12  2296667  EC-12  663333
SOYBEAN WHOLESALE PRICES  SOYBEAN MEAL WHOLESALE PRICES
USA  226  USA  203
EC-12  236  EC-12  232
SOYBEAN OIL WHOLESALE PRICES  EXCHANGE RATE FOR ECU
USA  409  1 ECU - 1.11
EC-12  380
Note:  Prices are a three year average of nominal
wholesale prices for 1986  to 1988.
SOURCE:  Toepfer International  (1989).
52APPENDIX A2:  95%  CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
AVERAGE  STD. DEV.  95%  CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
EEC PRICE AND QUANTITY CHANGES
SOYBEAN MARKET  (  )
EEC PRICE  2.1162  4.50  1.22  3.02
SUPPLY  1.7458  3.69  1.01  2.48
DEMAND  -2.9033  1.34  -3.17  -2.63
IMPORTS  -3.4360  1.90  -3.82  -3.06
MEAL MARKET
EEC PRICE  0.3407  2.07  -0.07  0.75
SUPPLY  -2.2994  1.06  -2.51  -2.09
DEMAND  -0.2401  0.45  -0.33  -0.15
IMPORTS  -2.9592  3.10  -3.58  -2.34
SOYBEAN OIL MARKET
EEC PRICE  -0.9883  2.59  -1.51  -0.47
SUPPLY  -0.5168  0.24  -0.56  -0.47
DEMAND  2.3431  4.62  1.42  3.27
EXPORTS  0.3662  1.03  0.16  0.57
US PRICE AND QUANTITY CHANGES
SOYBEAN MARKET
US PRICE  -2.2425  1.33  -2.51  -1.98
SUPPLY  -1.5783  0.91  -1.76  -1.40
DEMAND  1.9117  1.10  1.69  2.13
EXPORTS  -1.7017  0.94  -1.89  -1.51
SOYBEAN MEAL MARKET
US PRICE  -7.2129  7.39  -8.69  -5.73
SUPPLY  1.5141  0.87  1.34  1.69
DEMAND  2.9592  3.10  2.34  3.58
EXPORTS  -0.9250  0.97  -1.12  -0.73
SOYBEAN OIL MARKET
US  PRICE  -0.7917  2.13  -1.22  -0.37
SUPPLY  0.3403  0.20  0.30  0.38
53DEMAND  0.3662  1.03  0.16  0.57
IMPORTS  0.0017  0.00  0.00  0.00
WELFARE CHANGES FOR THE EEC
SOYBEAN MARKET
PRODUCER  6963.97  15016.19  3961  9967
RENT
CONSUMER  -69129.2  147622.0  -98654  -39605
RENT
BUDGET  133560.8  183495.9  96862  170260
SURPLUS
TOTAL RENT  71395.57  54479.15  60500  82291
SOYBEAN MEAL MARKET
PRODUCER  8358.06  50052.14  -1652  18368
RENT
CONSUMER  -16820.2  102779.7  -37376  3736
RENT
BUDGET  20707.53  32003.85  14307  27108
SURPLUS
TOTAL RENT  12245.40  35634.98  5118  19372
SOYBEAN OIL MARKET
PRODUCER  -8623.73  22593.26  -13142  -4105
RENT
CONSUMER  6535.40  16779.21  3180  9891
RENT
BUDGET  3318.16  6006.75  2117  4520
SURPLUS
TOTAL RENT  1229.83  433.59  1143  1317
NET CHANGE
IN
SOCIETY  84870.80  63343.99  72202  97540
54WELFARE CHANGES FOR THE US
SOYBEAN MARKET
PRODUCER  -251302  149677.6  -281237  -221366
RENT
CONSUMER  183543.3  146275.9  154288  212799
RENT
TOTAL RENT  -47086.2  37895.9  -54665  -39507
SOYBEAN MEAL MARKET
PRODUCER  -352739  360746.4  -424888  -280590
RENT
CONSUMER  338248.2  348458.5  268557  407940
RENT
TOTAL RENT  -14490.7  13469.66  -17185  -11797
SOYBEAN OIL MARKET
PRODUCER  -18341.9  49177.23  -28177  -8506
RENT
CONSUMER  18587.48  49716.22  8644  28531
RENT
TOTAL RENT  260.49  563.92  148  373
NET CHANGE
IN SOCIETY
IN SOCIETY  -68198.8  39081.4  -76015  -6038
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